From non-alignment to multi-alignment: how states hedge in uncertain times

Picture a leader at a crossroads, not with two roads, but with five. One points to Washington, another to Beijing, a third to Brussels, a fourth to Moscow, and a fifth to regional neighbours. In the Cold War, the map looked simpler. Many countries tried non-alignment, staying formally outside the US and Soviet camps. Today, the map is crowded, and the safer move often isn’t “stay out”, it’s “stay connected”.

That shift is what people now call multi-alignment: working with several major powers at once, depending on the issue, without handing over your freedom of choice. It’s less like picking a team, and more like building a balanced portfolio.

Why does this matter beyond foreign ministries? Because geopolitics now tugs at everyday life: energy bills, food prices, shipping routes, payment systems, chips, cloud services, and defence supply chains. This piece explains what changed, how hedging works in practice, the gains and dangers, and the signals worth watching in 2026.

From Cold War non-alignment to today’s multi-alignment, what actually changed?

Photo by RDNE Stock project

Non-alignment and multi-alignment can sound like the same idea: don’t get trapped by bigger powers. But they’re built for different worlds.

In the Cold War, the pressure often came in a single question: “Are you with us or against us?” Today, pressure arrives in pieces. A country might want US security help, Chinese trade, European standards for exports, Gulf energy, and Russian fertiliser, all at the same time. Refusing to choose one patron doesn’t mean refusing relationships. It means refusing exclusivity.

A simple way to see the shift is this:

Multi-alignment is not a moral badge. It’s a survival plan for states that can’t afford to break ties with half the world. It also reflects a blunt truth: most countries don’t have the luxury of running foreign policy as a purity test. They have budgets, elections, and import bills.

Non-alignment in plain English, and why it worked back then

Non-alignment was born in a world of clear camps. Many newly independent states wanted to avoid becoming a chessboard for the US and the Soviet Union. The basic bargain was: don’t join military blocs, don’t host foreign bases (or limit them), and keep room to trade and develop.

The Non-Aligned Movement, founded in 1961, gave that instinct a banner. You didn’t need to love either superpower to need their markets, aid, or weapons. Non-alignment tried to turn that need into bargaining power.

A concrete way neutrality protected room to move: a state could accept wheat, loans, or industrial support from one side, while also buying machinery or weapons from the other, without signing up to fight that side’s wars. In a two-bloc world, simply staying formally outside alliances created space. It was imperfect, but it was legible. Everyone understood the rules, even when they broke them.

If you want background on the older roots of this thinking, the Bandung story and its long shadow are captured in a multi-alignment and Bandung brief.

Why the old playbook broke, globalisation, new powers, and linked crises

After 1991, the tidy two-camp map dissolved. Trade and finance got thicker. Supply chains stretched across oceans. Tech standards became a form of power. A “neutral” stance didn’t protect you from being hit by a dispute you didn’t start.

Then came new weight in the system. China’s rise turned trade into strategy. The US still mattered hugely, but it no longer sat alone at the top. Russia remained a military and energy force. Regional powers gained confidence. In this environment, staying “out” became harder, because the world moved into your home through ports, pipelines, chips, undersea cables, and payment rails.

Recent shocks made the links visible. The Russia-Ukraine war didn’t only shape Europe’s security, it shook energy flows, fertiliser markets, and food prices. Tensions in the Middle East have repeatedly spilled into shipping risk and insurance costs. US-China rivalry has pushed export controls, investment screening, and debates about who gets which semiconductor tools and cloud services.

This is why the old playbook broke. You can avoid an alliance on paper and still be forced into choices on 5G vendors, refinery upgrades, drone parts, or which bank network clears your payments. In a tightly linked economy, neutrality doesn’t stop blowback. Hedging has to be active.

For a broader view of how middle powers see a shifting order, a Finnish foreign policy briefing lays out why so many states now chase autonomy without trying to burn bridges.

How states hedge in practice, the everyday tools of multi-alignment

Hedging isn’t lazy fence-sitting. It’s closer to running a household when prices swing: you don’t rely on one supermarket, one job, and one bank. You build options so a single shock doesn’t sink you.

In foreign policy, multi-alignment works the same way. It’s a set of moves that spread risk across partners, routes, and rules. Done well, it buys time and bargaining space. Done badly, it looks like opportunism and invites punishment.

Three mini-scenarios show the logic:

• A coastal state worries about piracy and regional conflict, so it trains with a Western navy, but it takes infrastructure finance from Asia and sells commodities to whoever pays best.
• A manufacturing hub wants export growth, so it adopts European product standards, attracts Japanese and Korean investment, and still keeps a large Chinese market for its goods.
• An energy importer fears price spikes, so it signs long-term LNG contracts with multiple suppliers, builds reserves, and keeps diplomatic channels open even with rivals.

Multi-alignment is also social. Leaders attend overlapping summits not just for photos, but to keep phone numbers active. When a crisis hits, the ability to call three capitals, not one, can be the difference between a managed shock and a spiralling one.

Mix-and-match partnerships, one partner for security, another for trade

The core idea is simple: different partners for different needs. A country might prefer one set of relationships for defence, and another for investment and trade. It might work with a third group on climate, public health, or disaster relief.

This is why overlapping memberships have become normal. A state can sit near US partners in one forum, take part in a China- or Russia-linked forum elsewhere, and still join regional groupings that prize consensus. Names matter less than the behaviour, but the overlap is visible in formats such as the Quad, BRICS, and the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO).

This mix-and-match approach spreads risk, like not putting all savings in one bank. If one partner turns hostile, introduces export controls, or demands political loyalty, the hedger has other doors to knock on.

The downside is friction. Big powers dislike “shopping around” when they want commitment. As rivalries harden, partners may ask, plainly, “Which side are you on?” That’s when multi-alignment becomes a test of nerve and planning, not just charm.

Hedging tool kit, deals, forums, and “insurance policies”

The tool kit is practical. It’s about keeping choices open when shocks land.

Common moves include:

Diversified arms buys so one supplier can’t ground your aircraft with spare parts restrictions.
Multiple trade talks so you aren’t locked into a single market’s rules.
Energy contracts with different suppliers (oil, LNG, nuclear fuel) so one disruption doesn’t cause a blackout.
Currency and payments back-ups so sanctions risk doesn’t freeze trade overnight.
Strategic reserves of food and fuel, because markets can panic faster than governments can meet.
Neutral diplomacy and mediation offers that keep channels open, even with rivals.
Regional clubs (ASEAN-style habits of bargaining as a bloc) to raise leverage with bigger players.
Careful UN wording: abstentions, balanced statements, and support for process rather than camps.

Behind these tools is one guiding aim: strategic autonomy, meaning decisions are kept at home. It doesn’t mean a country stands alone. It means it refuses to sign away the right to decide case by case.

Four real-world patterns, how India, Brazil, Saudi Arabia, and Indonesia juggle big powers

Multi-alignment looks different depending on geography and the size of a country’s economy. But the rhythm is often the same: keep trade flowing, protect security needs, and avoid becoming dependent on one gatekeeper.

As of early 2026, BRICS expansion and “BRICS+” discussions have become one arena where this balancing act plays out, alongside older ties with the US and Europe and deep economic links with China. The point for many members is not to build a new iron bloc, but to widen room to bargain on finance, development, and the rules of trade.

In practice, each of the four countries below wants a slightly different thing most of all. That “top priority” shapes how it hedges.

Rising powers use multi-alignment to gain leverage, not to hide

India’s multi-alignment is often described as being “friends with many, aligned with none”. It seeks investment and tech links with the US and Europe, manages a difficult border and competition with China, and keeps long-running defence and energy ties with Russia. It also works tightly with regional partners who share concerns about maritime security.

The visible sign is overlap. India is involved with the Quad, it stays active in BRICS, and it also engages in the SCO. That mix isn’t confusion, it’s a signal: India wants options in every room. Reporting on India’s efforts to strengthen European links also frames this as a contingency plan when US politics turn uncertain, as discussed in an ECFR analysis on India’s Europe “back-up plan”.

Brazil’s version is more economic than military. China is a central trade partner, especially for commodities and agriculture, while the US and the EU remain key for investment, finance, and political ties. Brazil often pushes for reforms to global rules while staying wary of any club becoming a hard anti-West vehicle.

This two-track style, working with Beijing while keeping working relations with Washington and Europe, is unpacked in a Belfer Center report on Brazil’s multi-alignment strategy. The risk for Brazil is reputational: if big-power rivalry sharpens, each side may judge neutrality as betrayal. The reward is room to sell, negotiate, and avoid being boxed into someone else’s fight.

Regional heavyweights use it to widen room to move on energy and security

Saudi Arabia’s balancing act starts from a long-standing security relationship with the US, while expanding trade and diplomatic ties with China, and maintaining contact with Russia, especially around energy coordination and regional talks. The aim is clear: keep security support, keep oil revenue stable, and widen diplomatic options so no single partner can dictate terms.

In late 2025 and into 2026, debates around BRICS and Middle Eastern strategies have underlined this widening approach. A useful snapshot of how BRICS links to regional hedging is in a Friedrich Naumann Foundation piece on BRICS and Middle Eastern multi-alignment. The risk for Saudi Arabia is being caught between sanctions pressure and energy diplomacy. The benefit is bargaining power, especially when great powers need stable oil markets and regional influence.

Indonesia’s approach sits on a strong non-aligned tradition, but with modern needs: investment, export growth, and maritime security across crowded sea lanes. Indonesia balances the US and China while leaning on ASEAN habits of consensus and non-interference. It tends to avoid loud ideological positioning and focuses on practical gains, ports, manufacturing, and food and energy security.

Indonesia’s growing role in wider groupings, alongside its ASEAN posture, reflects a simple instinct: keep many doors open and keep decision-making local. The risk is tension at sea and economic exposure if trade routes or commodity prices swing. The reward is flexibility, plus the ability to bargain as both a national player and a regional one.

The method differs, but the aim is the same: keep choices and reduce dependence.

Conclusion

The world has moved from a two-lane road to a crowded junction. Non-alignment was built for a clearer map, while multi-alignment is a response to tangled trade, tech, and security links. It’s a way to hedge when nobody can promise stability.

A quick checklist of signals to watch in 2026 helps cut through the noise: sudden sanctions pressure, forced tech choices (chips, 5G, cloud), arms supply disruptions, shipping and energy shocks, and voting splits at the UN that expose who is being pushed to pick a side.

Hedging fails when rivals demand exclusivity and punish neutrality. It pays off when a state keeps trade moving, protects key supplies, and avoids being dragged into conflict. In uncertain times, many states don’t choose a camp, they build a portfolio of relationships.