Why some countries are quietly drifting away from the US orbit

Nothing “happens” on a single day. No flag comes down, no treaty gets torn up on camera. Yet, across capitals from the Gulf to South America, you can feel the tilt. It’s like watching a crowd in a stadium. People don’t all stand at once, but the wave still rolls on.

When people talk about the US orbit, they usually mean a bundle of practical ties: security help and weapons, trade rules shaped by US preferences, dollar-based banking and payments, tech standards set by US firms, and diplomatic cover in global forums. For decades, many countries treated that bundle as the safest default.

This shift isn’t about countries “turning anti-American”. In most cases, it’s about keeping options open. Leaders want room to breathe if Washington changes course, if sanctions bite, or if a new crisis pulls US attention elsewhere. Below are the pull factors (what rivals offer), the push factors (what the US does that worries partners), and the quiet tactics countries use to drift without falling out.

The pull factors: what rival powers are offering that feels easier than Washington

The simplest way to understand the drift is to picture a marketplace, not a battlefield. Countries aren’t always “choosing sides”. They’re comparing offers, timelines, and conditions. And some offers feel easy to accept because they don’t demand public loyalty.

China, Russia, and a handful of regional powers have become skilled at making cooperation feel low-risk. The pitch often comes wrapped in practical language: a port, a rail line, a long-term fuel contract, a weapons package with fast delivery, a seat at a new table, or a public statement of support that helps a leader look strong at home.

Photo by Carlo Jünemann

China’s ‘no-lecture’ trade and infrastructure deals

China’s appeal often starts with speed. Many governments want visible results inside a single term: a widened highway, a new port crane, a 5G rollout, a rail link that cuts travel time. Beijing can bundle financing, contractors, equipment, and political support into one package.

The second part is tone. China’s deals are widely seen as “no-lecture” arrangements: fewer public demands about domestic politics, fewer headline conditions, more emphasis on delivery. For leaders under pressure to show progress, that’s tempting. The Gulf is a good example of how economics can sit beside existing US security ties. China has signalled interest in long-term energy supply at scale, as discussed after the China Gulf meetings in Riyadh (see analysis of Gulf energy ties with China).

But the trade-off is real. Fast money can become heavy money. Opaque contracts can limit public scrutiny. And dependence creeps in quietly: if your exports lean hard on Chinese demand, or your telecoms backbone depends on Chinese kit, your “choice set” narrows in future crises. Even when projects are useful, the leverage sits in the fine print.

Russia’s energy and security ties that keep working even under sanctions

Russia’s pitch is different. It’s less about shiny new infrastructure and more about relationships that lock in over time. Energy and security create long memories. If you need fuel, nuclear technology, or weapons systems, you don’t swap suppliers easily. Training, maintenance, spares, and doctrine all build a long chain back to the source.

Even under sanctions, Russia has kept energy exports moving and has remained a major arms supplier for countries that either can’t access Western kit or don’t want the political strings that come with it. The logic is blunt: if you need fuel and weapons, you stick with the supplier. Switching can take a decade, and it can leave you exposed in the meantime.

The risk is also blunt. Countries that deepen ties with Russia can face secondary sanctions, limits on access to Western finance, and reputational costs. They can also get pulled into wider confrontations, sometimes without intending to. The relationship can start as “business”, then become a liability once global pressure rises.

The push factors: how US choices make some partners step back without saying so

The drift isn’t only about what China or Russia offer. It’s also about what US power looks like from the outside in 2026: strong, but stretched; influential, but sometimes unpredictable; capable of building coalitions, but also quick to punish.

For many governments, the worry isn’t that the US will disappear. It’s that reliance on Washington can turn into a trap if politics at home in the US swings, or if a crisis makes your region feel like a side issue. So countries diversify. Not to replace the US, but to avoid being cornered.

Sanctions and the fear of getting cut off from dollars, banks, and tech

Sanctions work best when they’re credible, and the US has credibility. That’s also the problem. From the point of view of a finance minister or a central banker, sanctions can feel like a switch that can be flipped quickly. One announcement, and access to banks, insurance, shipping, or key technology can tighten overnight.

That fear pushes countries to build backups: more local currency trade, alternative payment rails, more gold reserves, more non-Western banking links. This is often described as dedollarisation, but the reality is messier. The dollar still dominates, yet the desire for “escape routes” is growing. For a balanced discussion of how far this can go, see BRICS and de-dollarisation, how far can it go?. And from the US strategic angle, the stakes are clear in why dollar dominance matters to US power.

The shift isn’t limited to rivals. Even friendly states watch sanctions episodes and think: “If politics turns, could that happen to us?” That question doesn’t need a public answer to shape policy. It just needs to exist.

Policy swings and ‘attention gaps’ that make US promises feel less steady

Another push factor is the rhythm of US politics. Elections can bring sharp pivots in trade policy, climate funding, foreign aid, and military posture. Partners sign one set of assumptions, then find the terms have changed mid-contract.

There’s also the issue of attention. The US can’t treat every region as the main theatre all the time. When Washington is consumed by one war, one rivalry, or one domestic crisis, other areas can feel the gap. That gap is where other powers step in, sometimes with lower standards but faster decisions.

You can see this hedging instinct in places that still rely on US security but want extra options. Middle East partners, for example, often keep US defence ties while expanding economic links with China, and widening diplomatic ties across new blocs. In Latin America, governments often complain that their region becomes “important” only in bursts, then fades from the top of the agenda. When attention feels cyclical, diversification starts to look like plain risk management.

How countries drift without burning bridges: the new ‘many-partner’ strategy

Most countries don’t want a dramatic break with Washington. The costs would be too high: market access, investment flows, defence cooperation, intelligence sharing, and tech links still matter. So the drift tends to look like a careful widening of circles rather than a sharp turn.

This is the “many-partner” strategy. Governments sign overlapping deals, join new forums, and spread exposure across currencies, suppliers, and alliances. Think of it like keeping more than one key in your pocket. You still use the front door, but you don’t want to be locked out if the lock changes.

Common tactics include:

• Buying weapons from different suppliers to avoid total dependence.
• Signing energy and infrastructure deals with multiple powers.
• Voting in international forums in a more mixed way, supporting the US on some issues and abstaining on others.
• Building local payment links and swap lines to reduce panic risk in a sanctions shock.

BRICS, regional blocs, and ‘non-aligned’ diplomacy that spreads risk

BRICS is often misunderstood as an “anti-West alliance”. It isn’t. In one sentence: BRICS is a group that began with Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa, and has expanded to include more members and partners, creating a larger platform outside US-led institutions.

As of January 2026, BRICS has already widened well beyond the original five, with Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, and the UAE joining as full members in January 2024, and Indonesia becoming the 10th full member in January 2025. A “partner country” status has also been used to bring in more states without full membership. The appeal is status, access to new markets, and the promise of more financial options. For deeper context on what expansion means and why aspirants are interested, see BRICS expansion and the future of world order.

The limits matter too. BRICS members don’t always agree, and the group doesn’t have a NATO-like structure. It’s not one “team” with a single plan. That’s also why it attracts hedgers. You can join without fully committing to anyone else’s conflicts.

Some analysts argue BRICS still struggles to turn momentum into action at scale, especially when internal interests clash (see BRICS is missing its chance). Even so, the signal is powerful: more countries want more tables.

Real-world examples readers recognise, from the Gulf to Brazil to India

In the Gulf, states that depend on US defence ties have widened economic partnerships with China and joined new groupings. The UAE’s BRICS membership from 2024 is a clear marker. It doesn’t cancel US links, it adds another channel.

Brazil often frames its foreign policy in terms of autonomy. Under Lula, the instinct has been to boost South South ties and to speak more freely on global disputes, while still trading heavily with the US and Europe. It’s a balancing act, not a break.

India has long called this approach “strategic autonomy”. In practice, it means cooperating with the US on some security concerns, while staying active in BRICS and maintaining ties that serve India’s interests. India leading BRICS in 2026 fits that pattern: more forums, more flexibility.

South Africa uses BRICS alongside African platforms, partly for status and partly to widen investment options. Its choices also reflect domestic politics, where non-aligned language still carries weight.

In each case, the motive is similar: reduce single-point dependence. The drift looks quiet because it’s built from small, practical decisions that add up.

Conclusion

Countries are drifting away from the US orbit in the same way people slowly stop using one shop for everything. They don’t hate the shop, they just want more choice. The world is moving towards a looser, more multipolar order where states shop for partners across security, trade, finance, and tech.

That shift has practical effects: more currency experiments and local trade settlement, more regional deal-making, tougher coalition-building for the US and its allies, and sharper competition over energy routes and tech standards. The next year will test how far the drift goes. Watch 2026 for sanctions policy signals, the pace of BRICS partner growth, Gulf choices on energy pricing and settlement, and big election cycles that can change foreign policy tone overnight.

If the “quiet drift” becomes a louder one, it won’t start with a speech. It’ll start with contracts, payments, and votes.